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1. Introduction 
 
The climate-trade nexus has become the focus of academic debate (e.g., Zhang, 1998, 2004; 
Zhang and Assunção, 2004), and has gained increasing attention as governments are taking great 
efforts to forge a post-2012 climate change regime to succeed the Kyoto Protocol. With concerns 
about their own competitiveness and growing greenhouse gas emissions in developing countries, 
some industrialized countries, if not all, are considering whether to impose unilateral trade 
measures against developing country trading partners. While it is clear that greenhouse gas 
emissions targets of developed countries need to be tightened further in a post-2012 climate 
change regime, developing country involvement is also crucial for climate change mitigation and 
adaptation, given that climate change is a global problem requiring a global response. This raises 
the issue of which approach would be most likely to stimulate developing countries to take 
appropriate actions in the post-2012 climate regime. Would positive or negative incentives work 
best, in other words, do we need carrots, sticks or both? 
 
This paper seeks to answer this question. By revisiting the six options for China that I envisioned 
a decade ago (Zhang, 2000) and examining a variety of factors, the paper first discusses how far 
developing country commitments can go in an immediate post-2012 climate regime. It argues that 
developing country commitments are most unlikely to go beyond defined policies and measures 
in this timeframe. The type of border adjustment provisions currently being discussed by most 
developed countries include more sticks than carrots for developing countries. Sticks can be 
incorporated, but only if they are credible and realistic and serve as a useful supplement to push 
developing countries to take actions or adopt policies and measures earlier than would otherwise 
have been the case. In order to encourage developing countries to do more to combat climate 
change, the paper suggests that developed countries should rather focus on carrots.  
 
2. Developing country commitments in an immediate post-2012 
climate regime1 
 
A decade ago, the fact that the U.S. took on emission reduction commitments at Kyoto, coupled 
with diplomatic and public pressure, put great expectations for China to take on some kind of 
commitment. Under these circumstances and in anticipation that the U.S. will take on more 
stringent commitments in the post-2012 period, I envisioned the following six proposals that could 
be put on the table as China’s plausible negotiation position, which are described in ascending order 
of stringency (Zhang, 2000).2 
 
“First, China could regard its active participation in the clean development mechanism as 
‘meaningful participation’.  
 
Second, just as Article 3.2 of the Kyoto Protocol requires Annex I countries to ‘have made 
demonstrable progress’ in achieving their commitments by 2005, China could commit to 
demonstrable efforts towards slowing its greenhouse gas emissions growth at some point between 
the first commitment period and 2020.  
 
Third, if the above commitment is not considered ‘meaningful’, China could make voluntary 
commitments to specific policies and measures to limit greenhouse gas emissions at some point 
between the first commitment period and 2020. Policies and measures might need to be developed 
to explicitly demonstrate whether or not China has made adequate efforts.  
 
Fourth, China could make a voluntary commitment to total energy consumption or total 
greenhouse gas emissions per unit of GDP at some point around or beyond 2020. In my view, 
carbon intensity of the economy is preferred to energy intensity of the economy because all the 
efforts towards shifting away from high-carbon energy are awarded by the former.  
 
The fifth option would be for China to voluntarily commit to an emissions cap on a particular 
sector at some point around or beyond 2020. Taking on such a commitment, although already 
burdensome for China, could raise the concern about the carbon leakage from the sector to those 
sectors whose emissions are not capped.  
 
This leads to the final option that China could offer: a combination of a targeted carbon intensity 
level with an emissions cap on a particular sector at some point around or beyond 2020. This is 
the bottom line: China can not afford to go beyond it until its per capita income catches up with the 
level of middle-developed countries.”  
 
At that time, it looked like China would be pressured to take on commitments at a much earlier 
date than what China wished. This situation changed once the U.S. withdrew from the Kyoto 
Protocol. A decade later, we see that the ideas of commitments based on carbon intensity and 
sectoral approaches are formally incorporated into the Bali Road Map. This Road Map aims to 
reach an agreement on the successor to the Kyoto Protocol, with a clear deadline for conclusion 
                                                 
1 See Zhang (2008 and 2009) for detailed discussion. 
2 Zhang (2000) was originally prepared for the United Nations Development Programme in 1998. 
When the draft of that paper was ready, the Washington DC-based Resources for the Future made 
a press release titled “Is China Taking Actions to Limit Its Greenhouse Gas Emissions?”, 15 
September 1998. 
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by 2009. This is a very positive development, and clearly indicates the policy relevance of the 
ideas that once sounded theoretical. However, I seriously doubt that developing countries will go 
beyond the aforementioned third option (i.e. commitment to defined policies and measures) 
between 2013 and 2020 for several reasons. 
 
First, given the very short timeframe to conclude the negotiations, it would be impossible, in all 
likelihood, to agree on the levels of ambitions for developing countries, on the countries and 
sectors covered, and on the specific rules, especially due to the amount of the data that would be 
required.  
 
Second, it is inconceivable that developing countries would ever go beyond the aforementioned 
third option between 2013 and 2020 without an effective financial mechanism. The pledged 
funding under the UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol represents only a small percentage of the 
anticipated mitigation and adaptation needs of developing countries (Zhang, 2008 and 2009). 
Unless this funding situation changes significantly, which is not likely to happen, developing 
countries cannot afford to make commitments beyond defined policies and measures. 
 
Third, the U.S. factor will continue to play a role in affecting developing countries’ willingness to 
take on commitments and the stringency of these commitments. While it was not adopted by the 
U.S. Senate in 2008, the Boxer Substitute of the Lieberman-Warner Climate Security Act (2008) 
provides a good idea of what future U.S. climate legislation might look like. Even if the Climate 
Security Act became law, U.S. emissions in 2020 would at best be kept at their 1990 level. This is 
far from the drastic cuts in emissions developing countries would expect before taking on their 
own commitments.  
 
 
3. Encouraging developing countries to take climate actions: 
carrots, sticks or both? 
 
Understandably, the U.S. and other industrialized countries would like to see developing 
countries, in particular large developing economies, go beyond commitment on policies and 
measures because of concerns about their own competitiveness and growing greenhouse gas 
emissions in developing countries. They are considering unilateral trade measures to induce 
developing countries to do so. Indeed, a variety of measures have been put forward for the U.S. 
legislators to consider, falling into the three broad categories: border adjustment measures, 
performance standards and carbon market design (Subcommittee on Energy and Air Quality of 
the U.S. House of Representatives, 2008). To date, there is considerable disagreement as to what 
measures would be most likely to pass muster under the WTO. For a number of reasons, 
including WTO consistency, but also political reality and effectiveness in terms of actual 
emissions reductions, industrialized countries need to focus on carrots, supported by sticks (e.g., 
border adjustment measures and similar trade-related measures or conditions on access to carbon 
markets), as a means of encouraging developing countries to do more to combat climate change. 
The Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer clearly demonstrates that an 
approach of carrots (financial assistance and technology transfer) assisted with sticks (trade 
restrictions) works effectively in achieving its legitimate environmental objective (Zhang, 2008).   
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3.1 WTO scrutiny of the Lieberman-Warner bill 
 
However, measures as proposed in the Climate Security Act hold out more sticks than carrots to 
developing countries. A proposal by the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW) 
and American Electric Power (AEP) would have required importers to obtain emission 
allowances to cover the carbon content of certain products from countries that do not take climate 
actions comparable to that of the U.S. (Morris and Hill, 2007). The original version of the bill 
incorporated this mechanism, threatening to punish energy-intensive imports from developing 
countries by requiring importers to obtain emission allowances, but only if they had not taken 
comparable action by 2020, eight years after the effective start date (2012 as proposed) of a U.S. 
cap-and-trade regime begins. It was argued that the inclusion of trade provisions would give the 
U.S. additional diplomatic leverage to negotiate multilaterally and bilaterally with other countries 
on comparable climate actions. Should such negotiations not succeed, trade provisions would 
provide a means of levelling the carbon playing field between American energy-intensive 
manufacturers and their competitors in countries not taking comparable climate actions. Not only 
would the proposed amendment have imposed an import allowance purchase requirement too 
quickly, it would also have dramatically expanded the scope of punishment: almost any 
manufactured product would potentially have qualified. If strictly implemented, such a provision 
would pose an insurmountable hurdle for developing countries (The Economist, 2008).  
 
It should be emphasized that the aim of including trade provisions is to facilitate negotiations 
while keeping open the possibility of invoking trade measures as a last resort. The latest version 
of the Climate Security Act brought the deadline down to 2014 to gain business and union 
backing.3 The inclusion of trade provisions might be considered the ‘price’ of passage for any 
U.S. legislation capping its greenhouse gas emissions. Put another way, it is likely that no climate 
legislation can move through U.S. Congress without dealing with the issue of trade provisions.  
While how long a grace period should be granted to developing countries needs to take many 
factors into consideration (Haverkamp, 2008) and is an issue of debate, significantly bringing 
forward the imposition of allowance requirements to U.S. imports is rather unrealistic, given the 
already very short grace period ending 2019 in its original version. It should be noted that the 
Montreal Protocol grants developing countries a grace period of 10 years (Zhang, 2000). Given 
that the scope of economic activities affected by a climate regime is several orders of magnitude 
larger than those covered by the Montreal Protocol, if legislation incorporates border adjustment 
measures (put the issue of their WTO consistency aside), in my view, they should not be invoked 
at least 10 years after mandatory U.S. emission targets take effect.  
 
Moreover, unrealistically shortening the grace period granted of two years before resorting to the 
trade provisions would increase uncertainty to withstand a challenge before the WTO. As the 
ruling in the Shrimp-Turtle dispute indicates, for a trade measure to be considered WTO 
consistent, a period of good faith efforts to reach agreements among the countries concerned is 
needed before imposing the measure. Put another way, trade provisions should be preceded by 
major efforts to negotiate with partners within a reasonable timeframe (Zhang, 2004; Zhang and 
Assunção, 2004). Furthermore, developing countries need reasonable time to develop and operate 
national climate policies and measures. Take the establishment of an emissions trading scheme as 
a case. Even for the U.S. SO2 Allowance Trading Program, the entire process from the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency beginning to compile the data for its allocation database in 
                                                 
3 This is in line with the IBEW/AEP proposal, which requires U.S. importers to submit 
allowances to cover the emissions produced during the manufacturing of those goods two years 
after U.S. starts its trade-and-cap program (McBroom, 2008).  
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1989 to publishing its final allowance allocations in March 2003 took almost four years. For the 
first phase of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme, the entire process took almost two years from 
the EU publishing the Directive establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance 
trading on 23 July 2003 to it approving the last national allocation plan for Greece on 20 June 
2005. For developing countries with very weak environmental institutions and that do not have 
dependable data on emissions, fuel uses and outputs for installations, this allocation process is 
expected to take much longer than what experienced in the U.S. and the EU (Zhang, 2007).  
 
In the case of a WTO dispute, the question will arise whether there were any alternatives to trade 
provisions that could fulfil the same function. In the Thai cigarette dispute, the Dispute 
Settlement Panel concluded that Thailand had legitimate concerns with health, but it had 
measures available to it other than a trade ban that would be consistent with the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) (e.g. bans on advertising) (GATT, 1990). Indeed, there 
are alternatives to resorting to trade provisions to protect the U.S. trade-sensitive, energy-
intensive industries during a period of good faith efforts to negotiate with trading partners on 
comparable actions. One way to address competitiveness concerns is to initially allocate free 
emission allowances to those sectors vulnerable to global competition, either totally or partially. 
Bovenberg and Goulder (2002) found that initially giving out about 13% of the allowances to 
fossil fuel suppliers freely instead of auctioning in an emissions trading scheme in the U.S. would 
be sufficient to prevent their profits with the emissions constraints from falling in comparison 
with those without the emissions constraints. 
 
To pass WTO scrutiny of trade provisions, the U.S. is likely to make reference to the health and 
environmental exceptions provided under GATT Article XX. This Article authorizes 
governments to employ otherwise GATT-illegal measures when such measures are necessary to 
deal with certain enumerated public policy problems. The GATT panel in Tuna/Dolphin II 
concluded that Article XX does not preclude governments from pursuing environmental concerns 
outside their national territory, but such extra-jurisdictional application of domestic laws would 
be permitted only if aimed primarily at having a conservation or protection effect (Zhang, 1998). 
The capacity of the planet’s atmosphere to absorb greenhouse gas emissions without adverse 
impacts is an ‘exhaustible natural resource’. Thus, if countries take measures on their own and 
have extra-jurisdictional application primarily to prevent the depletion of this ‘exhaustible natural 
resource’, such measures will have a good justification under the GATT Article XX. Along this 
reasoning, if the main objective of trade provisions in the Climate Security Act is to protect the 
environment by requiring other countries to take action comparable to that of the U.S., then 
mandating importers to purchase allowances from the designated special international reserve 
allowance pool is debatable under the GATT Article XX. To increase the prospects for a 
successful WTO defence, trade provisions can refer to the designated special international reserve 
allowance pool, but may not do without adding “or equivalent”. This will allow importers to 
submit equivalent emission reduction units that are not necessarily allowances but are recognized 
by international treaties to cover the carbon contents of imported products. 
 
3.2 Methodological challenge in implementing trade provisions 
 
Besides the issue of WTO consistency, there will be methodological challenges in implementing 
trade provisions. Identifying the appropriate carbon contents embodied in traded products will 
present formidable technical difficulties, given the wide range of technologies in use around the 
world and very different energy resource endowments and consumption patterns among countries. 
In the absence of any information regarding the carbon content of the products from exporting 
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countries, importing countries, the U.S. in this case, could, for instance, prescribe the tax rates based 
on their domestically predominant method of production for the imported products (Zhang, 1998; 
Zhang and Assunção, 2004). This practice is by no means without foundation. For example, the 
U.S. Secretary of the Treasury has adopted the approach in the tax on imported toxic chemicals 
under the Superfund Tax (Poterba and Rotemberg, 1995; Hoerner, 1998). To be more defensible, 
it should allow foreign producers to challenge the carbon contents applied to their products to 
ensure that they will not pay for more than they could have actually emitted. 
  
 
4. Concluding remarks 
 
Governments are taking great efforts to forge an agreement on comparable climate actions in the 
post-2012 climate negotiations. Aimed at levelling the carbon playing field, the inclusion of 
trade-related provisions is considered useful by some in both facilitating the adoption of such an 
agreement and effectively implementing it.   
 
With concerns about their own competitiveness and growing greenhouse gas emissions in 
developing countries, some industrialized countries, if not all, are considering the term 
‘comparable’ as the standard by which to assess the efforts made by their trading partners in order 
to decide on whether to impose unilateral trade measures on them. This clearly indicates a need to 
define comparable efforts towards climate mitigation and adaptation to discipline the use of 
unilateral trade measures at the international level, taking into account differences in national 
circumstances, such as current level of development, per capita GDP, current and historical 
emissions, emission intensity, and per capita emissions. 
 
While the Climate Security Act died on the floor of the U.S. Senate, this is by no means the end 
of the prospect for unilateral trade measures like the border adjustment measure stipulated in the 
U.S. bill, given that the inclusion of such trade provisions might be considered the ‘price’ for 
passing any U.S. legislation capping its greenhouse gas emissions. In addition to methodological 
challenges in implementing the Boxer-Lieberman-Warner type of border adjustment provision, 
this paper has argued that that type of border adjustment provision is likely to face a WTO-
consistency challenge. To increase the prospects for a successful WTO defence, there should be a 
period of good faith efforts to reach agreements among the countries concerned before imposing 
such trade measures. Furthermore, WTO consistency also requires considering alternatives to 
trade provisions for the same function. Moreover, the paper has suggested that trade provisions 
can refer to the designated special international reserve allowance pool, but should allow 
importers to submit equivalent emission reduction units that are recognized by international 
treaties to cover the carbon contents of imported products. 
 
It should be emphasized that the U.S. Climate Security Act contained more sticks than carrots to 
developing countries. If the U.S. and other industrialized countries really want to persuade 
developing countries to do more to combat climate change, they should first reflect why 
developing countries are unwilling to and cannot afford to go beyond commitments on policies 
and measures. That will require industrialized countries to seriously consider developing 
country’s legitimate demand that industrialized countries need to demonstrate that they have 
taken the lead in reducing their own greenhouse gas emissions, provide significant funding to 
support developing country’s climate change mitigation and adaptation efforts and to transfer low 
or zero carbon emission technologies at an affordable price to developing countries. 
Industrialized countries need to provide positive incentives to encourage developing countries to 
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do more. Carrots should serve as the main means. Sticks can be incorporated, but only if they are 
credible and realistic and serve as a useful supplement to push developing countries to take 
actions or adopt policies and measures earlier than would otherwise have been the case. At a time 
when the world community is starting to negotiate a post-2012 climate regime, unrealistic border 
adjustment measures are counterproductive to help to reach such an agreement on comparable 
climate actions in the post-2012 climate negotiations.  
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